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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE STEVEN CONDIE, 
vs. 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
DR. ROBERT L. YOUNGBLOOD, 
Defendant-
Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 16646 
This is an appeal from an order denying a Motion to Set 
Aside a Default Judgment previously entered. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Third District Judge Homer F. Wilkinson denied the plain-
tiff-appellant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment and affirmed the 
Judgment of Third District Judge Christine M. Durham which dis-
missed Plaintiff-Appellant's complaint. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts presented by Appellant Condie in his brief are 
incomplete and fail to adequately outline the sequence of events 
which occurred in this case. For this reason, Respondent Young-
blood shall supplement and enlarge the facts submitted by.the 
appellant. 
The issues in this case are by necessity completely inter-
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woven to the sequence of numerous occurrences during the liti-
gation process. In order to simplify the comprehension of this 
sequence Respondents will describe the events in a list format 
rather than the use of traditional text. Respondent believes 
that this method will assist this Court in its understanding of 
the factual sequence as they relate to the issues presented in 
this appeal. 
.f>ugust 7, 1974 
September 6, 1975 
October, 1975 
April 1, 1976 
September 15, 1977 
September 15 to 
December 15, 1977 
September 14, 1978 
September 14, 1978 
September 15, 1978 
Plaintiff is injured in motor-
cycle accident, (Appellant's 
brief, p. 2). 
Plaintiff enters hospital and 
treatment is begun by Respondent 
Youngblood. (Appellant's· brief, 
p. 2). 
Plaintiff sues hospital for mal-
practice (Appellant's brief, p. 2). 
"Utah Health Care Malpractice 
Act", Section 78-14-1 to 78-14-11, 
U.C.A. 1953 becomes effective. 
Attorney Taylor Carr files com-
plaint with District Court. (R., 
pp. 2-3). 
Attorney Carr issues summons to 
Brent Lowther, a process server. 
(Affidavit of Taylor Carr, (R., p. 
5). 
Identical complaint to Carr com-
plaint is signed and dated by Attor-
ney Don Hammill and issued to pro-
cess server, R.E. Weaver. (R., p. 
4). 
Hammill complaint and summons served 
upon Defendant. (R., p. 7). 
Attorney Carr signs Withdrawal of 
Counsel and mails copies to parties 
including Plaintiff. (R., p. 6). 
-2-
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September 20, 1978 
September 21, 1978 
December 19, 1978 
January 12, 1979 
January 13, 1979 
February 1, 1979 
February S, 1979 
.February 13, 1979 
February 13, 1979 
"Latter half" of 
May, 1979 
Attorney Don Hammill signs Notice 
of Appearance of Counsel. (R., p. 
8). 
Hammill Summons and Return of Ser-
vice, Carr Withdrawal of Counsel, 
and Hammill Entry of Appearance all 
filed with Clerk's Office. (R., pp. 
4,6,7,8). 
Attorney Hammill withdraws as coun-
sel and sends notice to parties in-
cluding Plaintiff. (R., p. 9). 
Defendant's attorney, David Slagle 
files Notice Requiring Plaintiff 
to Appoint Another Attorney Or To 
Appear in Person and mails notice 
to Plaintiff's address. (R., pp. 
11-12). 
Notice is delivered to Plaintiff's 
address by certified mail and signed 
for by Stephanie Hogenson. (R., p. 
25). Appellant has admitted receiv-
ing this notice. ~ppellant's brief, 
p. 3). 
Defendant's attorney files Motion to 
Quash Service of Summons and/or Mo-
tion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint 
and mails notice to Plaintiff's add-
ress. (R., pp. 13-14}. 
Notice and Motion are delivered to 
Plaintiff's address and are signed 
for by "M. Condie." (R., pp. 26, 38). 
Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss is grant-
ed by the Honorable Christine Durham 
and Judgment of Dismissal is filed 
with the Clerk. (R., pp. 17, 18}. 
copy of Judgment of Dismissal is mail-
ed to Plaintiff's address. (R., p. 19). 
Plaintiff learns that Judgment of 
Dismissal has been entered. {Plain-
tiff's Affidavit. (R., p. 21). 
-3-
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July 10, 1979 
July 18, 1979 
July 30, 1979 
August 27, 1979 
Plaintiff's present attorney files 
Motion to Set Aside Judgment (R., p. 
23). 
Hearing is held before the Honorable 
Homer Wilkinson and Plaintiff's Mo-
tion to Set Aside Judgment is denied. 
(R., p. 30) • 
Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion 
to Set Aside Judgment is executed by 
court and filed with Clerk. (R., p. 
32). 
Notice of Appeal from Order Denying 
Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside Judg-
ment is filed with clerk. (R., p. 
34} • 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING 
TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL. 
As Appellant admits in his brief the question of whether 
a trial court should set aside a default judgment is largely 
a discretionary matter and this Court will reverse the lower 
court's ruling only if it is clear that the court abused that 
discretion. Heath v. Mower, 597 P.2d 855 (Utah 1979). This 
reversal can only occur if there is an abuse of discretion that 
is arbitrary, capricious, or not based on adequate findings of 
fact or on law. Pacer Sport and Cycle Inc. v. Myers, 534 P.2d 
616 (Utah 1975). 
It is the burden of the moving party to establish suff i-
cient grounds to justify relief under Rule 60(b). State Collec-
-4-
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tion Bureau v. Roybal, 327 P.2d 337 (N.M. 1958). The movant 
must show that he used due diligence and that he was prevented 
from appearing by circumstances over which he had no control. 
Airkem Intermountain Inc. v. Parker, 513 P.2d 429 (Utah 1973). 
Applying the preceding principles to this case clearly 
mandates affirmance of the lower court's decision. 
A. Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside the Judgment was Un-
timely. 
The failure of Plaintiff to make a timely application 
pursuant to Rule 60(b) is in itself sufficient to affirm the 
lower court's decision. Rule 60(b) requires any motion based 
upon "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" 
to be brought "not more than three months after the judgment, 
order, or proceeding was entered or taken." 
The Judgment of Dismissal was entered in this case on Fe-
bruary 13, 1979. The Motion to Set Aside the judgment was not 
made until July 10, 1979. Thus, nearly five months elapsed 
between the time of the judgment and the time of the Rule 60(b) 
motion. 
This Court in Pitts v. McLachlan, 567 P.2d 171 (Utah 1977) 
has held that subsection l of Rule 60(b) is the exclusive reme-
dy for actions involving inadvertence or mistakes in failing 
to protect a litigant's rights. This Court stated: 
It seems inescapable, also, to conclude that 
Rule 60(b) (1) is applicable here in the let-
ter and spirit of rules governing procedure 
-5-
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and practice and the doctrine of the exer-
cise of diligence in the presentation of 
one's rights, failing which they are amenable 
to a limitations statutory feature looking to 
repose of litigation after a reasonable time, 
interdicted here to be three months under Rule 
60(b) (l}. Id. at 173-174. 
The court in Pitts rejected the use of Subsection (7) of Rule 
60(b) as applicable in cases where Subsections (l-6) clearly 
apply and therefore rejected the argument that a "reasonable 
time" for inadvertence and neglect was beyond the three-month 
limitation of Subsection (1). 
In Peck v. Cook, 510 P.2d 530 (Utah 1973) the plaintiff 
in that case filed a Motion to Set Aside a Default Judgment 
on the ground that through the mistakes, inadvertence, and ex-
cusable neglect of his attorney the plaintiff had failed to in-
elude necessary elements in a default judgment he had obtained 
against a defendant. This Court affirmed the lower court's 
dismissal of this motion on the grounds that the motion was un-
timely since it was not made within the three months after the 
default judgment was entered. 
Plaintiff's own affidavit admits that he learned of the 
judgment approximately three months after it had been entered 
(R., p. 21) and yet no motion was made for nearly two more 
months. 
Appellant in his brief quotes this Court's case of Mayhew 
v. Standard Gilsonite Company, 376 P.2d 951 (Utah 1962) in sup-
port of his position that the judgment should have be~n set 
-6-
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aside. Even this quotation, however, states that a "timely 
application" must be made. (Appellant's brief, p. 4). 
In this case Plaintiff failed to meet the time requirements 
of Rule 60(b) and for this reason alone the lower court's judg-
ment should be affirmed. 
B. Plaintiff Failed to Meet His Burden in Asserting Suf-
ficient Grounds Under Rule 60(b) to Justify Relief. 
Plaintiff contends that he has "tendered a reasonable ex-
cuse for his non-appearance and failure to attend the hearing." 
(Appellant's brief, p. 5). In his affidavit filed July 2, 1979 
Plaintiff stated that he never received copies of the Motion to 
Dismiss nor the Notice of Hearing; that the address contained 
in the certificate of mailing to the plaintiff was the address 
of his estranged wife; that for "most of the month" of January, 
1979 Plaintiff was traveling and not residing at the C Street 
address; and that Plaintiff spent "most of the month" of Febru-
ary, 1979 in the hospital. (R., p. 21). 
Even if Plaintiff had filed a timely Motion for Relief 
under Rule 60(b) the reasons stated in his affidavit are not 
legally sufficient to justify relief under that rule. 
First, it is clear that Defendant in obtaining the judgment 
of Dismissal followed the correct procedure in circumstances 
where a party is not being represented by an attorney. A review 
of the procedure and sequence of events which occurred in this 
case is as follows: 
-7-
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On December 19, 1978 attorney Don Hammill filed a "With-
drawal of Counsel and mailed a copy of this document both to 
Defendant's attorney and to Plaintiff at 326 C Street, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84103. (R., p. 9). 
Haromill's Withdrawal of Counsel complied with Section 78-51-
34 and Section 35, Utah Code Annotated (1953). The former sta-
tute allows an attorney to withdraw before judgment or final 
determination "upon his own consent, filed with the clerk or 
entered upon the minutes." The latter statute requires notice 
to be given to the adverse party of such withdrawal. It states: 
Effect - Notice of Change. - When an attorney 
is changed as provided in the next preceding 
section (78-51-34), written notice of the 
change and of the substitution of a new party 
or of the appearance of the party in person 
must be given to the adverse party; until 
then he must recognize the former attorney. 
This Court in Salina Canyon Coal Company v. Klemm, 290 P. 
161 (Utah 1930) commented upon the predecessor of this statute 
and stated: 
Our statutes seem to imply that an attorney 
who has appeared for a party may be treated as 
such by opposing counsel until opposing counsel 
are notified of dismissal or change of attor-
neys. 
Likewise, a California court, in interpreting an identical 
statute to that of Utah's, stated that the purpose of the sta-
tute is to allow the court to know whether the party has an at-
torney of record. Until there is a showing that an attorney 
has been discharged or substituted the former attorney should 
-8-
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receive all papers. Russ v. Russ, 156 P.2d 767 (Ct. App. Cal. 
1945). See also Epley v. Califro, 323 P.2d 91 (Cal. 1958). 
Thus, Section 78-51-35 requires that notice of withdrawal 
or substitution must be sent to the opposing party. This sta-
tute, contrary to Appellant's assertion in his brief, is not 
for the protection of the party whose attorney has withdrawn 
but is rather for the protection of the adverse party. (Appel-
lant's brief, p. 5). In referring to Section 285 of the Cali-
fornia Code of Civil Procedure, identical to Section 78-51-35, 
U.C.A., a California court noted the following: 
While Section 285 of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure provides that when an attorney is changed, 
written notice must also be given to the ad-
verse party, such notice is for the protection 
of the adverse party •••• The party effect-
ing the change cannot object to his own fail-
ure to give notice. Anderson v. City Rail-
way Ry. Company, 42 P.2d 969 (Ct. App. Cal. 
1935). 
Thus, the Withdrawal of Counsel filed by Attorney Hammill 
informed Defendant that Hammill was no longer representing 
Plaintiff and released Hammill from any further requirement of 
receiving papers on behalf of Plaintiff. 
Upon receipt of Hammill's withdrawal, Section 78-51-36 
then became effective and required Defendant's attorney to no-
tify Plaintiff to obtain another attorney or to appear in per-
son. This section states the following: 
Notice to appoint successor - When an attorney 
dies or is removed or suspended, or ceases to 
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act as such, a party to an action or proceed-
ing for whom he was acting as attorney must 
before any further proceedings are had against 
him be required by the adverse party, by writ-
ten notice, to appoint another attorney or to 
appear in person. 
This section was clearly intended to safeguard a litigant 
who no longer has an attorney by advising him that he must 
either obtain a replacement attorney or represent himself in 
further proceedings. Such statute advises the litigant of his 
responsibility and consequences if the responsibility is not 
met. 
In discussing a similar Montana statute the Supreme Court 
of Montana stated the following: 
The statute has been discussed at length 
in Endresse v. Van Vleet, supra, 118 Mont. 
at page 537, 169 P.2d at page 721, where 
it is said: "In 3 Cal.Jur., sec. 41, p. 
632, concerning an identical section (286) 
of the California Code of Civil Procedure, 
it is said: 'This section means no more 
than it plainly says, viz., that no pro-
ceedings may be had against a party, no 
judgment or order or other step be taken, 
until he appoints an attorney unless the 
prescribed notice be first given. Hand v. 
Hand, 312 P.2d 990, 993 (Mont. 1957). 
In the instant case Defendant's attorney sent by certified 
mail a notice in compliance with this statute on January 12, 
1979. (R., p. 11). The notice was sent to the same address 
which had been utilized in the past by Plaintiff's own attorney! 
in notifying him of their withdrawal. (R., p. 12). Plaintiff 
received this notice even though the receipt was signed by a 
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person named Stephanie Hogenson. (Appellant's brief, p. 3; 
R., p. 27). Some 20 days later Defendant's attorney again sent 
by certified mail a Motion to Dismiss and Notice of Hearing. 
(R., pp. 25-28). This notice was sent to the same address as 
previously and was receipted by a M. Condie. (R., p. 28). 
Approximately two weeks later the hearing was held before 
the Honorable Christine Durham at which time the "court deter-
mined that the plaintiff received proper notice of said hearing." 
(R. I p. 18). 
At no time did Plaintiff contact Defendant's attorney and 
request that additional time be given to him to find an attor-
ney, inform him that Plaintiff would be unavailable at the add-
ress listed in the pleadings for service of papers, or make any 
other communication indicating Plaintiff's inability to receive 
pleadings or represent himself in any proceeding. Defendant 
correctly followed the procedure in making the Motion· for Dis-
missal. 
After the judgment had been entered Defendant's counsel 
again mailed to Plaintiff a copy of said judgment to the same 
address on the very day that the judgment was entered. (R., p. 
19). 
The alleged failure of Plaintiff to learn of this judg-
ment is not grounds for Rule 60(b) relief since Rule 58A(c} 
provides that a judgment is complete and is deemed entered for 
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all purposes when it is signed and filed, not when notice is 
received by the parties. The failure to learn of a judgment 
is therefore not grounds for relief. In Re Bundy's Estate, 241 
P.2d 462 (Utah 1952). 
The trial court ruled that the affidavit filed by Plain-
tiff was insufficient to justify the failure to attend or 
otherwise provide for the February 13 hearing. The affidavit 
leaves many questions unanswered. It fails to explain, for 
example, what relationship Plaintiff had with his "estranged" 
wife~ whether Plaintiff still resided at the "C" Street address 
during that time; why he received the January 13 notice but did 
not receive the February l notice; when and where Plaintiff was 
traveling in the month of January; the reason for Plaintiff's 
hospitalization in February and the days of such hospitalization; 
and finally, why the plaintiff did not learn of the judgment 
after it had also been sent to that address. 
The case of Heath v. Mower, 597 P.2d 855 (Utah 1979) is 
remarkably similar to the instant case. In that case Defen-
dant's counsel filed a Notice of Withdrawal and ser.t a copy to 
the defendant and to the other party. A Notice of Pretrial was 
sent by the District Court clerk to the defendant's address and 
Plaintiff's attorney additionally mailed a copy of the notice 
by certified mail to Defendant's address. The notice was re-
turned "unclaimed" a short time later. 
A pretrial was held and the defendant failed to appear. 
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The court entered judgment against him and in favor of plain-
tiff. Several days later a Mail-0-Gram was filed with the 
Clerk's office statiDg that the defendant would be unable to 
attend the prior meeting and that an attorney would contact 
the plaintiff's attorney shortly. 
Plaintiff filed a timely motion pursuant to Rule 60(b) 
asking for the default judgment to be set aside. Defendant 
filed an affidavit claiming he never received notice of the pre-
trial by certified mail and that he only received notice through 
a telephone conversation with his former wife. 
This Court affirmed the lower court's denial of relief 
from the default judgment because the defendant did not offer 
"the trial court a reasonable excuse for his non-appearance so 
as to bring him under the rule that courts should liberally 
exercise their power to set aside default judgments." 
This Court noted that the affidavit filed by the defendant 
did not offer any significant reason why he did not appear at 
the pretrial hearing and why he did not pick up the notice sent 
to his address. The opinion observed that "aside from these 
vague and sometimes incorrect statements, Mower's affidavit 
does not attempt to explain the reasons for his failure to appear 
at the pretrial hearing." In addition, a party trying to set 
aside a default judgment "must show that he has used due diligence 
and that he was prevented from appearing by circumstances over 
which he had no control." Citing the case of Airkem Intermountain v. 
-13-
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Parker, 513 P.2d 431 (Utah 1973). This Court concluded by 
holding that the trial court was within its discretionary bounds 
in ruling that Defendant did not satisfy the Airkem standard to 
explain why he claimed the various attempts to notify him were 
futile. 
·Therefore, the record supports the lower court's ruling 
that even had a timely application for relief been made, the 
plaintiff would still not be entitled to Rule (60(b) relief 
because of his failure to adequately explain the reasons for 
his non-appearance and non-receipt of the properly served no-
tices upon him. For this reason the lower court decision should 
be affirmed. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DISMISSAL OF THE 
COMPLAINT AND TO QUASH SERVICE WAS MERI-
TORIOUS AND THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR 
IN GRANTING IT. 
Appellant argues that as a matter of law the defendant was 
not entitled to the Judgment of Dismissal upon the grounds urged 
by the defendant. Appellant devotes more than half of his brief 
to this argument. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6-12). 
Because Plaintiff-Appellant did not make a timely appli-
cation for relief nor did he demonstrate sufficient grounds un-
der Rule 60(b) to be entitled to relief, any question concern-
ing the Judgment of Dismissal is merely academic and in this 
case serves no useful purpose. However, since Plaintiff has ar-
-14-
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gued the merits of the original Order of Dismissal, Defendant 
Youngblood will briefly respond. 
On February 1, 1979 Defendant's attorney filed a "Motion 
to Quash Service of Summons and/or Motion to Dismiss Plain-
tiff's Complaint." (R., p. 13). As noted by the appellant, 
Defendant Youngblood claimed improper service of the summons 
and complaint; barring of the action by the statute of limita-
tions; failure to comply with the Utah Health Care Malpractice 
Act; and failure·to diligently prosecute the claim. 
Defendant based his claim of improper service upon the 
following facts: The original complaint was filed on September 
15, 1977 by Plaintiff's attorney of record, Taylor Carr. (R., 
pp. 2-3). Mr. Carr later stated in an affidavit that he had 
issued a summons in this case within three months after the 
filing of the complaint by placing it in the hands of a process 
server named Brent Lowther. (R., p. 5). Assuming this to be 
true it is undisputed that Defendant was never served with the 
summons issued by Mr. Carr. 
Instead, an unusual event occurred. On September 14, 1978 
(one day short of being a full year from the date that the Carr 
complaint was filed) Mr. Don Hammill, an attorney, issued a 
second summons and rewrote the original complaint using his name 
and letterhead. (R., p. 6). The Hammill summons and complaint 
was served upon Defendant on the same day, September 14, 1978. 
(R., p. 7). 
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At the time that this second stumnons was issued and served 
Mr. Hammill was not the attorney of record of Plaintiff. Mr. 
Carr did not sign a Withdrawal of Counsel until September 15, 
1978. (R., p. 8). Mr. Hammill did not sign a Notice of Ap-
pearance until September 20, 1978. (R., p. 4). Neither the 
withdrawal nor the appearance were filed with the Clerk's Office 
until September 21, 1978. (R., pp. 4, 8). 
Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure state that an 
action may be conunenced by filing a complaint with the court 
or by service of a stumnons. This action was obviously commenced 
by the filing of the complaint on September 15, 1977. 
Rule 4(b) states the following: 
If an action is conunenced by the filing of 
a complaint, stumnons must issue thereon with-
in three months from the date of such filing. 
The stumnons must be served within one year 
after the filing of the complaint or the ac-
tion will be deemed dismissed .••• (Emphasis 
added). 
Rule 4(a) defines "issuance of stumnons" as follows: 
The stumnons may be signed and issued by the 
plaintiff or his attorney. A sununons shall 
be deemed to have issued when placed in the 
hands of a qualified person for the purpose 
of service. Separate sununonses may be issued 
and served. (Emphasis added). 
Thus, if September 15, 1977 is to be the commencement of 
the action it was necessary for the record to reflect that 
Defendant had been served with the sununons which had been is-
sued by Attorney Carr three months from the date of filing the 
complaint. The record on its face, however, shows that the 
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swnrnons served was dated September 14, 1978 and was signed by 
Attorney Don Hanunill. (R., p. 6). Further, the complaint 
which was served was not the complaint that had been filed al-
most a year earlier. 
The summons served upon Defendant in this case, therefore, 
was neither issued within "three months" from the date of the 
original filing of the complaint nor was it issued by the 
plaintiff's attorney. At the time the summons was served upon 
Defendant, Taylor Carr was Plaintiff's attorney and the proce-
dure outlined by Utah statutory law, previously referred to, 
had not yet been invoked. For this reason Hammill could not 
issue a summons or change Carr's complaint by merely placing 
his name upon a revised version. 
As stated by the Oklahoma Supreme Court: 
To be an attorney of record the attorney's 
name must appear somewhere in the permanent 
records or files of the case or on the appear-
ance docket. Tway v. Hartman, 75 P.2d 893 
(Okla. 1942). 
The unusual procedure employed by Plaintiff in attempting 
to serve Defendant within the one-year period prescribed by Rule 
4(b) was improper and did not confer jurisdiction upon the Dis-
trict Court. The failure to file a correctly issued summons and 
to serve it timely upon Defendant was fatal to Plaintiff's cause 
of action and, therefore, Judge Durham was correct in granting 
Defendant's motion based upon Plaintiff's failure to comply 
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with Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In addition, the Statute of Limitations then in effect 
clearly precluded an action being brought. section 78-12-28 
U.C.A. required an action for malpractice to be brought within 
two years. Paragraph 2 of Plaintiff's complaint claims that 
Defendant "negligently permitted during the swnrner of 1975 a 
severe infection to develop at the site of decubiti." tR., p. 2). 
Thus, the alleged time period for the malpractice would have 
been June, July, and August of 1975. 
Even if it were assumed that the September 15, 1978 com-
plaint and sununons were valid the commencement of such action 
would not have been within two years of the alleged negligence 
as evidenced by the complaint itself. Furthermore, the fact 
that Defendant maintained a residence in the county and was 
therefore susceptible to service at all times did not toll the 
statute of limitations as claimed by Appellant. Woolf v. Gray, 
158 P. 788 (Utah 1920); Cf. Snyder v. Clune, 390 P.2d 915 (Utah 
1965). 
Admittedly, Defendant's claim of the notice requirement 
under the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act is now moot in light 
of the 1979 amendment to Section 78-14-8 which took effect on 
_April l, 1979. At the time of the argument on Defendant's mo-
tion, however, this law was not in effect and this Court's de-
cision in Vealey v. Clegg, 579 P.2d 919 (Utah 1978) was control-
ling and notice was, under that decision, a prerequisite to 
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Plaintiff filing suit. 
Finally, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to 
Prosecute was addressed to the sound discretion of the trial 
court in its determination of the circumstances surrounding 
the conduct of the parties and other factors enumerated by 
this Court. Westinghouse Electric Supply Company v. Larsen 
Contractor, Inc. 544 P.2d 876 (1975); Brasher Motor and Finance 
Company v. Brown, 461 P.2d 464 (1969). 
In the Judgment of Dismissal entered February 13, 1979 
the court specifically noted that it considered the basis of 
Defendant's Motion and found "good cause existing." (R., p. 
18). It is therefore to be assumed that the trial court found 
validity in the merits of Defendant's arguments regardless of 
Plaintiff's failure to appear at the hearing. 
For the preceding reasons, therefore, the judgment of the 
trial court in granting Defendant's Motion for Dismissal was 
meritorious and further justified the subsequent refusal to set 
aside said judgment based upon Rule 60(b). 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has appealed from an order denying relief from 
a judgment previously entered against him. Plaintiff in his 
brief has completely failed to justify the untimely request for 
Rule 60(b) relief or to explain how the trial court abused its 
discretion in concluding that sufficient cause did not exist 
to set aside the judgment. 
Instead, Plaintiff in his brief has attempted to argue the 
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merits of the original Order of Dismissal which is merely col-
lateral to the question now before this Court. Even so, however, 
Judge Durham correctly dismissed Plaintiff's complaint for fail-
ure to properly serve Defendant as required by the Utah Rules, 
for failing to initiate the action within the statute of limi-
tations, and for failure to diligently prosecute Plaintiff's 
own case. 
For these reasons, therefore, the lower court was correct 
in refusing to set aside the Order of Dismissal and the judgment 
of the lower court should therefore be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
~ :;c:rs::; &MARTINE:u 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I, Craig s. Cook, hereby certify that I mailed two copies 
of the preceding brief of Respondent to Appellant's attorney, 
Thom o. Roberts, 400 Ten Broadway Buildin~, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84101, postage prepaid, this 21st day of December, 1979. 
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